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The authors explore to what extent there is persistence in, and interrelation between, 
alliance strategies with different partner types (customers, suppliers, competitors). In a 
panel data set of innovation-active firms in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2004, the 
authors find persistence in alliance strategies with all three types of partners, but 
customer alliance strategies  are more persistent than supplier alliance strategies and 
competitor alliance strategies. A positive interrelation between customer and supplier 
alliance strategies and a high persistence of joint supplier and customer alliance 
strategies are consistent with the advantages of value chain integration in innovation 
efforts. Prior engagement in horizontal (competitor) alliances increases the propensity to 
engage in vertical alliance strategies, but this effect occurs only with a longer lag. 
Overall, the authors’ findings suggest that alliance strategies with different partner types 
are both heterogeneous in persistence and (temporally) interrelated. This suggests that 
intertemporal relationships between different types of alliances may be as important as 
their simultaneous relationship in alliance portfolios. 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  There is a growing consensus in the literature that a firm’s involvement in inter-firm 
technology alliances matters for its economic and innovative performance (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Powell et al., 1996; Ahuja 2000a; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). Research on alliances has 
initially focused on the questions ‘why’ and ‘when’ alliances are formed (Kogut and Zander, 
1993; Powell and Brantley, 1992). Interdependence and resource complementarities have 
been addressed here as the most common explanation for the formation of inter-
organizational ties (Richardson, 1972; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Harrison et al., 2001). The 
literature has since broadened significantly and saw the emergence of two streams of research 
that have focused in particular on interrelationships and alliances between firms. The alliance 
network literature has focused on the question with which individual partner(s) firms tie up, 
and the role of network embeddedness and network structural properties herein (e.g. Podolny, 
1994; Gulati, 1995a;  Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Chung et al., 2000). In this way, it has been 
demonstrated that collaboration with specific partners tends to be highly persistent (Gulati, 
1995b; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Mowery et al., 1998; Goerzen, 2007). However, this literature 
has abstracted from differences in partner attributes and resource complementarities across 
partner types.  The alliance portfolio view, on the other hand, has focused on potential 
complementarities between different partner types as they bring in different sets of knowledge 
or complementary capabilities (Lavie, 2007; Vassolo et al, 2004; Lokshin and Duysters, 
2008).  This literature has focused on specific subsets of partner attributes, such as their 
relative bargaining power (Lavie, 2007), degree of foreignness (Lavie and Miller, 2008; 
Lokshin and Duysters, 2008), or their specific technology domain (Sampson, 2007). A 
conclusion emanating from these studies is that the role of partner attributes may be as 
important as the role of networks’ structural properties (Lavie, 2007; Faems et al, 2005; 
Belderbos et al, 2004a). 4 
 
  Despite the broadening of the alliance literature and the notion that collaboration with 
different types of partners is driven by different motives and characterized by different risks 
and corresponding needs for control (Parkhe, 1993), little attention has been paid to the 
differences  in persistence  of, or  interrelations between,  alliances  strategies  with different 
partner types. This paper is the first to systematically explore such differences in persistence 
of, and interrelation between, different alliance types, by distinguishing between alliances 
with suppliers  and/or  customers  (vertical collaboration) and  alliances with competitors 
(horizontal collaboration), within a context of technological collaboration.  Whereas vertical 
inter-firm relations are seen as spanning differentiated organizations that combine 
symbiotically to achieve collective ends, horizontal inter-firm relations span similar 
organizations that combine commensalistically to achieve collective ends (Baum and Ingram, 
2002; Tidd et al., 2005). The different partner types play different roles in complementing a 
firm’s own resources and capabilities, related to potentially different goals of the alliances 
(Faems et al.,  2005;  Belderbos  et al., 2006),  which  may  not only carry differential 
implications for a firm’s proclivity to engage in such alliances but may also yield potential 
interrelationships between them. Hence, we anticipate differences in persistence as well as 
interrelationships between alliance strategies with different partner types.  
  We examine persistence and interrelation of alliance strategies in a comprehensive panel 
dataset  on innovating firms in the Netherlands, 1996-2004.  Persistence is defined as the 
degree to which prior involvement in an alliance strategy predicts current alliance strategy 
engagement. In contrast to most previous empirical work that relied on alliance press reports, 
we use official statistical survey data drawn from the harmonized European Community 
Innovation Survey.  An important advantage of this source is the fact that repeated 5 
 
observations are included on the same firms over longer periods (e.g. 6-10 years), making the 
data very suitable for analysis of persistence in alliance strategies.
1 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND   
  A number of literature streams suggest persistence of alliance strategies through various 
mechanisms and processes. We review the most important lines of thinking in this section.
  First,  persistence in alliance strategies can be expected by  considering  the role  of 
habitual forces and path dependence. Organizations  tend to establish routines that are 
associated with satisfactory performance, which are then replicated and perpetuated, leading 
to path-dependency in their behavior and strategy (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988). Seen in this way, persistence of a certain alliance 
strategy may be attributable to a firm’s reliance on routine action that favors repetition of past 
action (Li and Rowley, 2002).  Persistence will be further reinforced, as  suggested by 
Williamson’s remediableness criterion (1999), by the presumption that an established mode 
of organization (e.g. collaboration) forms an efficient strategy as long as no superior feasible 
alternatives are present that offer net gains when implemented (e.g. a stand-alone strategy).
2 
  The extant literature on interorganizational relations and social capital suggests that 
network  embeddedness  is  also  likely to contribute to persistence of collaboration. Both 
through relational and structural embeddedness, a firm’s network structure forms a key source 
of information over time that helps to lower search costs and to alleviate risks of opportunism 
(Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988). This leads to a process of ‘structural differentiation’ in 
which firms increasingly come to possess distinct relational profiles and network positions, 
                                                 
1 We discuss the limitations of the data and our approach in the concluding section. 
2 We note that, on the other hand, routines may become inflexible over time and difficult to change, leading to 
inertia (Levitt and March, 1988; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Gilbert, 2005). Hence, although firms may pursue 
persistent alliance strategies as this may bring benefits, this does not imply that persistence will always carry 
positive performance effects. As recently shown there may also be a downside to persistence in collaboration in 
case the external environment changes in radical ways (Koka and Prescott, 2008). 6 
 
forming an additional source of information on potential partners over time (Gulati and 
Garguilo, 1999). Persistence of collaboration is attractive as it provides firms with an ongoing 
stream of information that becomes available by being embedded in a network structure.      
  Another view on alliances and interfirm collaboration is taken by resource based theory. 
Resource-based theory emphasizes the development of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable resources as the basis for competitive advantage and superior innovation 
performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Following this perspective, a firm’s dyadic 
and network relations are seen as constituting a source of relational rents and competitive 
advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998). By means of collaboration, firms can create synergistic 
combinations of assets, knowledge and/or capabilities that may contribute to lowering the 
costs and/or increasing the perceived value of their offerings. Leveraging the complementary 
resources of its alliance partner(s) successfully, however, implies that firms need information 
about their potential partners and the resources they possess (Gulati, 1995a). The ability to 
find and interpret information on potential partners, and to carefully discriminate among 
them, is enhanced by the amount of collaborative experience (Gulati, 1999; Duysters  & 
Heimeriks, 2007). In addition, firms with more collaboration experience will also be more 
desirable as partners, be better able to generate value from partnerships and hence be more 
likely to engage in future collaboration (Gulati 1995a; 1999;  Walker et al., 1997).  As a 
consequence, experience in alliances and inter-firm collaboration may form an important 
source of relational rents for firms, contributing to its potential for generating supernormal 
returns (Dyer and Singh, 1998).   
  Alliances can also contribute to the development of dynamic capabilities that represent a 
firm’s ability to integrate and (re)combine internal and external knowledge and competences 
in order to strengthen and renew its competitive advantage over time (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007). In this way, persistent use of 7 
 
alliance strategies may allow companies to maintain a focus on their core domains through in-
house specialization while external collaboration may provide them with a window on newly 
emerging (technological) opportunities that fall beyond their core areas of expertise (Ahuja, 
2000b).  Depending on their resource deficiency,  companies  may consider the specialized 
resources and capabilities as held by suppliers and customers (vertical collaboration) and 
competitors (horizontal collaboration) and how they may differentially contribute  in 
providing complementarity.  
  Finally, a governance perspective on alliances is concerned with how collaboration may 
affect possibilities for appropriability and risks of imitation by indicating that partners may 
engage in opportunistic behavior (Teece, 1986; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Nooteboom, 2004a; 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). More specifically, such collaborative hazards may be formed by 
risks  of undesirable knowledge spillovers and free-ridership, which are considered (far) 
higher in horizontal collaboration when compared to vertical collaboration (Ahuja, 2000a). 
Seen in this way, a governance view sheds some more light on the extent to which partner 
types differ in their risk profiles, which may possibly carry implications for differences in 
persistence of and interrelation between horizontal and vertical alliances.  
  Most of the literature has not given specific attention to differences in alliance strategies 
depending on the type of partner. Vertical and horizontal alliances have both been subject of 
investigation in prior research, but two streams of literature appear to have developed in 
relative isolation. In the literature on technology alliances, most studies have not made an 
explicit distinction between types of alliance partners or have restricted analysis to horizontal 
alliances within an industry (Mowery et al., 1996, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000; Ahuja, 2000a, 
2000b; Sampson, 2007). In contrast, the supply chain literature has largely focused on vertical 
alliances with suppliers or customers (e.g. Lee et al., 1997; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; Vickery 
et al., 2003). The objectives and performance effects of vertical alliances have also been 8 
 
found to differ from those of horizontal alliance with the latter frequently focusing on more 
radical innovations and the former on cost reduction or on reducing time to market (Belderbos 
et al, 2004a; 2004b; Tether, 2002). Although it has been demonstrated that collaboration with 
customers and/or suppliers as well as with competitors can be (highly) beneficial for firms 
(e.g. Von Hippel, 1978; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Ahuja, 2000b), the interrelationships 
between these alliances strategies or partner type specific persistence have not been subject of 
research until now.    
 
DATA AND METHODS 
  The empirical analysis uses a panel data set constructed from five consecutive European 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) conducted in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in the Netherlands. The sampling methodology and the 
harmonized questionnaire are described in the OECD Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997). The CIS 
surveys contain data concerning R&D expenditures and innovation activities of the firm, and 
engagement in collaborative technology development distinguished by partner type. The 
technology alliances in the survey relate to joint development efforts and collaboration on 
R&D.  Since we are interested in the persistence of technology alliances, our analysis is 
naturally confined to firms engaging in innovative activities for which technology 
collaboration is relevant.  An important advantage of this source is the fact that repeated 
observations are included on the same firms over longer periods (e.g. 6-10 years), making the 
data very suitable for analysis of persistence in alliance strategies. Another advantage is the 
diversity of firms included in the data: both large R&D intensive firms as well as small and 
medium sized enterprises are included, and the data cover a wide spectrum of industries. 
Hence, use of this dataset avoids the problem of oversampling of large firms and the lack of 
systematic information on alliance disbandment, which has hampered prior research using 
data on alliance announcements (Schilling, 2009). On the other hand, we note the limitations 9 
 
of this extensive longitudinal dataset in that it does not reveal identities of individual partner 
firms or the number of alliances of each type. For our purpose, the analysis of differences in 
persistence and interrelationships between alliance  strategies  with different partner types, 
these drawbacks pose fewer problems. 
  The sample includes 4632 observations on 3181 innovating firms from a wide range of 
sectors (we distinguish 17 sectors at the 2-digit level). Each observation requires that the firm 
has responded in three consecutive survey years, as this is required to examine persistence in 
our empirical model. Given the partially random sampling in each year for smaller firms, we 





  Technology  alliances.  The CIS surveys ask if the firm had any cooperation 
arrangements on innovation activities with other firms in the last 2 years. Cooperation 
agreements are then differentiated by the type of partner such as customers, suppliers, and 
competitors. Based on this question, we create three dependent variables taking the value one 
if a firm reported to be engaged in a particular type of alliance, i.e. customer, supplier or 
competitor, and zero otherwise
4.  We define persistence as the degree to which prior 
involvement in alliances with a specific partner type predicts current involvement in such 
alliances. This approach follows the definition of persistence as 'state dependence' (e.g. 
Heckman, 1981), which in our context means that being engaged in past alliance activities 
increases the probability to be engaged in these activities currently. A similar approach has 
been used to analyze persistence in profits (Mueller, 1977;  McGahan and Porter, 2003), 
                                                 
3 A balanced sample only leaves 591 observations. Results on this strongly reduced sample gives qualitatively 
similar results.  
4 It is possible that especially large firms have multiple technology alliances of a particular alliance type. The 
CIS surveys however do not contain information on the number of alliances per type.  10 
 
innovation (Roberts, 1999; Raymond et al., 2010) or other measures of firm performance such 
as Tobin’s q (Villalonga, 2004). We examine persistence and interrelation by including as 
covariates dummy variables measuring past engagement in technology alliances as reported 
in the previous surveys conducted two and four years earlier. We note that, although the 
surveys ask for alliance engagement in a 2-year period, we cannot entirely rule out that there 
are (short-lived) ‘gaps’ between alliance engagement in t and t-2, and likewise t-2 and t-4, as 
firms may also dissolve an alliance within the survey period. Hence, we define persistent 
alliance strategies as recurrent engagement in a particular alliance type in three consecutive 2-
year periods. While the coefficients on prior involvement in the same type of alliance indicate 
persistence, the coefficients on prior involvement in the other two types of alliances indicate 
interrelation (see equation 1 below). 
As control variables, we include R&D intensity (the share of R&D employees in total 
employment) and its squared term. R&D engagement increases a firm’s capacity to recognize, 
value and assimilate external knowledge from alliance partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Kim, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In this way, more R&D-intensive firms are also more 
likely to engage in several technological collaboration projects but with diminishing 
propensity (Belderbos et al, 2004b). The analysis also controls for firm size. The literature 
indicates that the size of companies plays a role in propensity to be engaged in collaboration. 
Larger firms have more abundant resources and may find it less problematic to handle 
multiple innovation objectives and management of multiple technology collaborations (e.g. 
Belderbos et al., 2006; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Harrigan, 1988). We include the logarithm 
of the number of employees. R&D intensity and firm size are taken from the (t-2) survey.  We 
also include firm age. Older companies tend to be more experienced and will have well-
established routines in place (Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1988), also specifically 
geared to collaboration, which may positively affect their propensity to be engaged in 11 
 
collaboration. On the other hand, well-established routines and abundant experience may also 
make that firms tend to become more self-reliant (Tidd et al., 2005), which reduces their 
propensity to be engaged in external collaboration. Furthermore, we control for whether the 
firm is an affiliate of a foreign multinational firm or part of a larger domestic group. Firms 
that are part of a larger group may draw on group financial and technological resources and 
reputation to make them more attractive as cooperation partners and to support collaborative 
efforts (e.g. Ahuja, 2000b). At the same time such firms may have fewer incentives to 
cooperate with outside partners, as they are likely to have intra-group R&D collaboration 
opportunities. 
Finally we include a set of time dummies and industry dummies (16 at the 2-digit 
industry level) as the need for technology collaboration and the use of particular alliances 
types may differ across industries and across years. We also include eleven region (province) 
dummies as the opportunity for collaboration arising from, for instance, differences with 
regard to innovation activity  or clustering of suppliers may vary systematically across 
locations (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and lists correlations between the variables used 
in the estimation. Table 1 indicates that supplier collaboration is most frequently adopted, 
with 13.1 % of the cases, followed by customer collaboration (10.1 %) and competitor 
collaboration (6.6 % cases). In addition, 8.3% of the firms are engaged in both supplier and 
customer collaboration, indicating a relatively frequent use of such combined supplier and 
customer alliances. The percentages are comparable for current and past alliances. The R&D 
intensity of the firms in the sample is on average 3.1 percent. The table does not indicate 
multicollinearity problems for the set of independent variables, Apart from the naturally high 12 
 
correlation between R&D and its squared  term and the negative correlation between the 









  In order to analyze the determinants of the persistence of and interrelationships between 
alliance strategies with the three types of partners, we estimate a multivariate probit model 
with the dummy variables ‘competitor alliance’, ‘customer alliance’ and ‘supplier alliance’ as 
dependent variables. The error terms of the three individual probit equations are likely to be 
correlated if firms are simultaneously considering decisions to engage in the three types of 
alliances. Use of the multivariate probit model in which we simultaneously estimate the 
propensity to be engaged in alliance strategies with the three partner types addresses this 
problem and leads to an improvement in the efficiency of the estimates.  
  Given that we analyze unbalanced panel data, we also estimated probit equations for 
each alliance type using panel probit estimators with random effects.
6 The estimates from 
these individual equations are consistent, albeit not efficient because they do not take 
correlation between equations into account.  We used a  likelihood ratio test to test the 
significance of the panel-level variance component (rho) in the total variance. In the customer 
and competitor equations we could not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero at any 
conventional level. In the supplier equation the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 5 
percent level but was just rejected at the 10 percent level. Overall, these results indicate that 
                                                 
5 We also examined multicollinearity through the condition number of the matrix of regressors. This statistic 
(the ratio of largest to smallest eigenvalue) is an unbounded measure of collinearity, or ill-conditioning, in the 
data (Belsley, 1991). These diagnostic measures did not indicate problems of collinear regressors in our models. 
6 Fixed effects probit estimator produces inconsistent estimates due to so called 'incidental parameters problem' 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 484). 13 
 
the panel-level variance component is only of marginal importance  and that the pooled 
multivariate probit estimators are to be preferred over the random effects estimator.  The 
implication is that we could proceed by estimating the equations as a multivariate probit 
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where i indexes firms and t years, accordingly;  1 , it y ,   2 , it y , and  3 , it y  are the binary indicators 
which take the value one if a firm reported to be engaged in an alliance with customers, 
suppliers and competitors, respectively, and zero otherwise. CUS, SUP, and COM measure 
alliance engagement in the previous two surveys: t-2 refers to the survey 2 years before, and 
t-4 refers to the survey 4 years before. The size and significance of the coefficients on the past 
alliance for the same type variables indicate the degree of persistence of alliance strategies 
with each partner type. The error term  it ω in equation 1 is assumed to be random in each of 
the three equations, and the vector Z contains our control variables. The coefficients to be 
estimated,  k , 1 β  through k , 6 β , are not constrained across the three equations, but the model 
allows us to test whether the determinants of the  alliance strategies of each type are 
significantly different across equations. 
   An important issue in the empirical analysis is potential endogeneity biasing our 
results. It has been noted that this type of selection bias is of particular importance in 
performance studies since managers’ decisions are endogenous to their expected performance 
outcomes (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2006; Leiblein et al; 2002; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; 
Shaver, 1998; Argyres, 1996).  In  the context of our analysis, it is possible that some 14 
 
unobserved firm specific factors affect the propensity to be engaged in alliances and/or 
specific alliance types, such that firms are ‘selected in’ persistent alliance strategies. The 
effect of past engagement in alliances with specific partner types on the current probability to 
be engaged in an  alliance  strategy  with  specific  partner  types then could in theory be a 
corollary of this selection effect rather than a real persistence effect. In our analysis, we 
expect this bias to be limited or non-existent, for a number of reasons. First, potential 
selection effects due to unobserved heterogeneity are mitigated by the use of a wide set of 
firm-specific control variables that affect the propensity to be engaged in specific alliance 
types. Second, while remaining selection effects cannot be entirely  ruled out, this may 
potentially lead to an upward bias in the persistence effects, but it is not evident why it would 
lead to systematic differences in persistence across alliance partners, nor is it evident that this 
should affect patterns of interrelation between alliance strategies with different partner types. 
Third, one would expect that estimation with firm individual effects would control for the 
relevant unobserved firm characteristics that may drive longer term selection into alliance 
types. As we note in the paper, tests of random effect estimators show that these random 
effects are jointly insignificant (the random effects model is rejected in favor of the 
multivariate probit), again suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity leading to selection is 
not likely to bias our results. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION  
  Table 2 reports the results from the multivariate probit explaining the propensity of 
firms to be engaged in alliance strategies with the three types of partners. The appendix 
contains the results of a separate probit model explaining the propensity to be engaged in 
(vertical) value chain spanning alliance strategies (supplier and customer alliances combined).  
  A first observation from Table 2 is that the correlation coefficients of the error terms in 15 
 
the multivariate probit model (Rho) are positive, ranging from 0.5 to 0.8, and highly 
significant. This supports the notion of interdependence between the decisions to be engaged 
in  alliance strategies with different partner types and confirms the need to use the 
simultaneous equations approach.    
--------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
  The estimated coefficients indicate a varied pattern of persistence and interrelation with 
generally positive coefficients, although not all of these are statistically different from zero. 
We can identify three stylized patterns in  the empirical results, with one pattern on 
differences in persistence and the other two patterns applying to the interrelations between 
alliance strategies with different partner types.  
  First,  alliance strategies with different  partner types are persistent, but in different 
degrees. The coefficients on the corresponding past alliance variable for t-2 (listed on the 
diagonal of Table 2) are significant in each of the three equations. In addition, the coefficient 
on (t-4) lagged alliances is significant in the customer equation and marginally significant in 
the competitor equation, but not in the supplier equation. Hence, there is persistence but the 
strength of it differs between partner types. The coefficients support a significantly greater 
persistence of customer alliance strategies compared with the other two alliance strategies. A 
t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the t-2 and t-4 own lagged 
terms in the customer equation is equal to the own lagged terms in the supplier equation 
(0.51, p<0.01) and the competitor equation (0.38, p<0.05).  
  For customer alliance strategies, the persistence effects are also significantly stronger 
than interrelation effects. T-tests reject that the sum of the past customer alliance coefficients 
is equal to the sum of coefficients of past supplier alliance strategies (0.65, p< 0.01) and past 
competitor  alliance strategies (0.54, p<0.01).   On the other hand, in  the  supplier and 16 
 
competitor equations t-tests do not reject equality of the coefficients of the own lagged terms 
and the coefficients of the other alliance strategies. Hence, we conclude that persistence 
effects for the same alliance strategy are not necessarily more pronounced than the 
interrelation effects between alliance strategies.  
  Furthermore, two distinct interrelation patterns emerge from the empirical results. A 
first interrelation pattern emerging from the results is a positive interrelation between supplier 
and customer alliance strategies. Supplier alliances in t-2 have a significantly positive impact 
on the propensity to be engaged in a customer alliance strategy, and vice versa. In addition, 
past customer alliances in t-4 have an additional positive impact on the propensity to engage 
in supplier alliance strategies, although there is no significant effect of supplier alliances (t-4) 
on customer alliances. Overall, these findings are indicative of a strong interrelation between 
vertical alliance strategies with both partner types, with the strongest and consistent impact 
found for recent past alliances (t-2). 
  The  second interrelation pattern is  a  positive  interrelation  between vertical and 
horizontal  alliance strategies, but with a longer lag.  The results show  that recent past 
competitor alliances (t-2) have no impact on the propensity to be engaged in a supplier or 
customer alliance strategy. In contrast, if we examine past alliances with a longer lag (t-4), the 
results do show a significant impact of past competitor alliances on the propensity to be 
engaged in an alliance strategy with suppliers or customers (Table 2). These results (which 
are corroborated in an analysis of the probability to be engaged in joint supplier and customer 
alliances presented in the Appendix) show that past engagement in alliances with competitors 
increases the propensity to be engaged in an alliance strategy with customers or suppliers, but 
that  this  interrelation  effect  only occurs with a longer  lag  (t-4) when compared to the 
interrelationship between collaboration with suppliers and customers (which is strongest for t-17 
 
2).
7  In addition to the patterns described above, the empirical results also show that the 
propensity to engage in competitor alliance strategies increases due to past customer alliances 
(t-4) and recent past supplier alliances (t-2).  
  Among the control variables, firm size  is positive and significant  in each of the 
equations. The effect of R&D intensity  on the propensity to be engaged in technology 
alliances is curvilinear in all equations, with a declining marginal impact for high R&D 
intensities. Age carries a small, negative effect that may reflect a decreasing propensity to be 
engaged in external, innovation-based collaboration when firms age. Firms that are part of a 
foreign multinational or a domestic group generally have a greater propensity to be engaged 
in alliances. Location also matters: the  likelihood-ratio test rejects the constrained 
specification in which location (province) dummies are jointly set to zero, in favor of the 
specification with the province dummies (LR = 510.83, p-value< 0.001).  In particular, firms 
located in less populated areas such as provinces in the north of the country, appeared less 
likely to be engaged in R&D collaboration. In addition, the time and industry dummies (not 
reported) are jointly significant: the likelihood-ratio test rejects the constrained specification, 
in which time and industry dummies are jointly set to zero, in favor of the specification with 
the dummies (LR = 618.42, p-value<0.001).  
  To test whether there are also differential effects of the past alliance variables between 
manufacturing and service firms, we applied a Chow test (e.g., Gujarati, 2005, p. 275) by 
including 6 interaction effects in each equation between a service dummy and the past 
alliance strategies. The likelihood ratio test (15.29, p-value=0.64) could not reject the null 
hypothesis these interaction effects are jointly zero. This suggests that there are no systematic 
                                                 
7  In sensitivity tests, we also examined the impact of an even longer lag between horizontal and vertical 
alliances, including the variable horizontal alliance engagement in t-6. Such a test requires data on firms in four 
consecutive surveys, and this more than halves our sample given the underlying sampling process. Competitor 
collaboration in t-6 was not significant in any of the equations, while the positive and significant coefficients of 
horizontal alliance engagement in t-4 remained robust. Hence, the empirical regularities seem to point to an 
effective lag of roughly 4 years. 18 
 
differences in the role of persistence and interrelation between the manufacturing and services 
industries in our sample. 
 
Interpretation of findings 
  Overall, our findings demonstrate that alliance strategies with individual partner types 
are persistent, that is: past engagement in alliances with a partner type predicts the propensity 
to be engaged in this type of alliance strategy currently. This corresponds with the various 
theoretical approaches to alliance formation. Persistence may arise from alliance 
collaboration experience (Gulati, 1999) and the possibility to capture relational rents (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998), through the establishment of (collaborative) habits and routines (Cyert and 
March, 1963),  and  through  network embeddedness (Gulati 1995a; Gulati and Garguilo, 
1999). However, while these perspectives endorse the omnipresent role of persistence, the 
literature has not provided a more in-depth understanding of the differences in persistence of, 
and interrelation between, alliance strategies with different partner types. Below, we explore a 
number of possible explanations for the observed patterns that draws on the various views 
and, in addition, borrows insights from the innovation literature.  
  First, customer alliance strategies are most persistent. Here an explanation may be 
sought in the notion in the innovation literature that demand-pull forces tend to be strong 
determinants of innovative activities  (e.g.  Dosi, 1988). Collaboration with customers is 
generally considered to be useful throughout the entire innovation process (Dosi et al., 1990; 
Von Hippel, 1988). This applies both to its early phases in which collaboration with lead 
users can provide firms with access to novel ideas that may be indicative of a (large) future 
market (Von Hippel, 1978) or where they may act as partners in co-creation (Prahalad and 
Krishnan, 2008), and to its later phases with their emphasis on gaining market acceptance for 
the new innovation and stimulating its wider diffusion (Dosi et al., 1990; Tidd et al., 2005).  19 
 
  In addition, a governance view suggests that spillover risks in customer alliances are 
relatively limited when compared to collaboration with suppliers  or competitors. 
Collaboration with suppliers may lead these to become more qualified and hence more 
attractive as partners to competitors, potentially enabling the latter to free-ride on the 
investments made by the focal firm (Park and Russo, 1996; Mesquita et al., 2008). Although 
risks of opportunism and the prevention of leakage of proprietary knowledge may lead firms 
to vertically integrate, this comes at a price of reduced flexibility and (high) integration costs 
(Williamson, 1975; Argyres 1996). An alternative strategy may be formed by collaboration 
based on which these risks can also be reduced through partnership exclusive arrangements 
and relational governance between the focal firm and its supplier(s) (Zaheer and 
Venkataraman, 1995; Mesquita et al., 2008). However, this may not contribute to persistence 
of alliance strategies with suppliers. Instead, when suppliers are engaged in the innovation 
process, a more temporary and sometimes ad-hoc type of collaboration may often  be 
considered as more appropriate, with a clearly focused and project-based form (Andersen, 
1999). In addition, an increasing dependence of a focal firm on collaboration with, and an 
elevated risk of knowledge spillovers through, suppliers will increase the inclination to 
consider alternatives to collaboration, such as internal development or market procurement 
(Gulati et al., 2005). Hence, whereas collaboration with suppliers may be attractive for the 
focal firm, the risk of spillovers and its corresponding remedial measures may reduce the 
persistence of a supplier alliance strategy. Although the risk of spillovers can also be present 
in collaboration with customers, these may be outweighed by the strategic value of access to 
(scarce) information on specific customer needs and the higher likelihood of initial market 
acceptance and (future) commercial success. This is different in case of collaboration with 
competitors in which the risk of undesirable knowledge spillovers is particularly present. Due 
to  relatively similar knowledge bases and competences, competitors may have a greater 20 
 
capacity for absorption and appropriation of knowledge spillovers, creating a temptation for 
free-ridership (Park and Russo, 1996; Khanna et al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2004b). This is also 
related to the idea of ‘coopetition’ in alliances according to which the cooperative aspect 
refers to the creation of common knowledge that is shared between partners whereas the 
competitive aspect refers to the use of this common knowledge to make private gains in an 
attempt to outperform the partner (Khanna et al., 1998; Ritala, 2009). As a consequence, 
collaboration with competitors comes with more risks than collaboration with customers, 
mitigating a firm’s propensity to be engaged in competitor alliance strategies.  
  Second, our results indicate that firms engaged in supplier (customer) collaboration 
are likely to engage in customer (supplier) alliance strategies in a subsequent period. These 
findings are consistent with the idea in the supply chain literature that alliances with suppliers 
and customers are often not pursued in isolation but may be interrelated due to the potential 
advantages of value chain integration offered by such collaboration (Vickery et al., 2003; 
Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001). This may be attractive because it offers the possibility for 
realizing product innovations and/or implement process improvements in a more rapid, cost 
effective and integral manner (Choi and Hartely, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Childerhouse et al., 
2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003).  
  The advantages of innovation collaboration through the value chain also suggest that 
simultaneous engagement in customer and supplier alliances are likely to be beneficial and 
persistent. We explored this by estimating an equation with the propensity to engage in a joint 
supplier and customer alliance strategy as the dependent variable and we report on this in the 
Appendix. We find that past joint supplier and customer alliance strategies have a strong and 
significant effect on current joint alliance strategies. The estimated coefficients indicated that 
this persistence is significantly greater than the coefficients estimated for individual alliance 
strategies in Table 2: the coefficients on the past joint terms suggest that their combined effect 21 
 
is 20-30 percent higher than the combined effect of the t-2 and t-4 coefficients measuring 
persistence of individual alliances with suppliers or customers. In addition, past (t-2) alliances 
with  either  customers  or with  suppliers  have  a positive impact on simultaneous alliance 
strategy with suppliers and customers, suggesting that firms engaged in supplier (customer) 
collaboration are likely to add customer (supplier) cooperation in a subsequent period.  
The strong persistence of joint supplier customer collaboration is consistent with the 
view  that  stronger alignment between collaboration with suppliers and customers may 
contribute to realizing the potential offered by value chain integration, such as the elimination 
of operational inefficiencies (e.g. ‘bullwhip’ effects due to demand variability), the reduction 
of defects, the lowering of total value chain costs, an increase in product differentiation and 
an acceleration of product development cycles ((Diez-Vial, 2007; Lee et al., 1997; Gulati and 
Sytch, 2007; Choi and Hartely, 1996;  Childerhouse et al., 2002).  In addition, stronger 
alignment may also contribute to the development of shared interests among partners that 
reduces room for conflict and contributes to the build-up of trust, further diminishing risks of 
spillovers and/or free-ridership (Nooteboom, 2004b). In this way, joint collaboration further 
solidifies vertical coordination and knowledge exchange that may contribute to lowering the 
costs and/or increasing the perceived value of their offerings (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati 
and Sytch, 2007), and may enhance the development of more complex and broadly based 
dynamic capabilities encompassing the entire value chain (Teece et al., 1997; Stalk et al., 
1992).  
  The third observed  pattern suggested that  past engagement in alliances with 
competitors increases the propensity to be engaged in an alliance strategy with customers and 
suppliers  but with a longer  lag  (t-4) when compared to the interrelationship between 
collaboration with suppliers and customers (strongest for t-2).  An  interpretation for this 
pattern starts from the notion that the objectives and performance effects of vertical alliances 22 
 
often differ from those of horizontal alliances. Here, prior studies have demonstrated that 
alliances with competitors are often most effective for the generation of new-to-the-market 
products, while supplier and customer alliances tend to impact on productivity growth and 
incremental product improvements (Belderbos et al, 2004a; Faems et. al, 2005). This suggests 
that the two types of alliances may complement each other and that some degree of alignment 
between horizontal and vertical collaboration contributes to the development of dynamic 
capabilities that enables firms to accomplish new forms of competitive advantage in order to 
address changing environmental demands (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhard and Martin, 2000). 
On the other hand, a governance view highlights the risk of undesirable knowledge spillovers 
and freeridership, especially in case of collaboration with competitors (Ahuja, 2000b). This 
suggests  important risks and drawbacks of a  combined  vertical and horizontal alliance 
strategy. However, the governance risks are foremost an issue if the two types of 
collaboration overlap in time, such that the focal firm functions as the bridge between 
competitors and vertical partners. At the same time, the complementary  relationship 
suggested by the competence view leaves open the possibility of reaping the benefits by 
combining horizontal and vertical collaboration in a more consecutive manner. Established 
insights from the innovation and (product) life cycle literature provide such arguments for 
consecutive alignment benefits where it concerns the transition from horizontal to vertical 
alliances.  
  In the innovation literature on technology life cycles, it is argued that an initial focus on 
exploration, with its emphasis on creativity and small-scale experimentation, makes room for 
a focus on exploitation characterized by a focus on efficiency and (large scale) 
commercialization (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990). Seen in this light, horizontal alliances may be particularly well suited 
for exploration while vertical alliances may be considered as especially useful for 23 
 
exploitation. The literature on exploitation and exploration has suggested that these may then 
be optimally combined through a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ strategy, formed by temporal 
separation between the two activities (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006). In contrast, the 
alternative strategy of ‘ambidexterity’ formed by organizational separation between the two 
activities at the same point in time will not mitigate the governance risks of combining the 
two types of alliances (Gupta et al., 2006). Moreover, temporal separation does not need to be 
harmful for exploration. On the contrary, it can enhance the explorative nature of horizontal 
collaboration by providing seclusion from current markets and established practices. In this 
way, more room is offered to maneuver and experiment freely and to obtain novel inspiration 
and insights  from  new  and  disruptive  developments  that  typically emerge beyond the 
boundaries of an established industry (Gilsing, 2005).  Simultaneous collaboration with 
customers and/or suppliers with its a strong(er) exploitation focus may hamper this and may 
increase the risk of missing out on such newly emerging key trends in new technologies and 
markets.  These considerations on inter-temporal relations between horizontal and vertical 
alliances do not play a role in the case of interrelation between supplier and customer 
alliances. On the contrary, a longer lag in this case would cause a delay that inhibits the 
alignment of collaboration with suppliers and customers that is required for accomplishing the 
strategic objectives of vertical collaboration.   
  Finally, we found positive effects of past customer alliances with a longer lag (t-4) and 
of recent past supplier alliances (t-2) on the propensity to be engaged in competitor alliances. 
A  tentative  interpretation for these findings may be that alliances with customers and/or 
suppliers can also form an important source of highly new ideas that may possibly go (well) 
beyond the price-performance ratio of established technology (Christensen, 1997). Such ideas 
can be several such as, for example, insights into how current products and/or processes, 
based on established technology, fail to address existing customer needs (Christensen and 24 
 
Bower, 1996). But also insights into latent customer needs that remain unmet (Aaker, 1996), 
insights into the limitations of suppliers’ (technological) capabilities or, alternatively, into 
their unrealized innovative potential (Tidd et al., 2005) may form sources of highly 
innovative ideas. Capitalizing on these ideas may induce a need for the creation of a next-
generation technology, possibly in collaboration with competitors (Christensen et al., 2002). 
In this way, accumulated insights on future opportunities for innovation, as obtained from 
collaboration with customers and/or suppliers, may serve as an inducement to initiate 
collaboration with competitors for the creation of next-generation technology. If vertical 
collaboration precedes horizontal collaboration in time, in a similar vein as discussed above, 
governance risks related to  overlapping alliance strategies  can be significantly reduced, 
without sacrificing the combinatory benefits of vertical and horizontal alliances. So, the 
interrelationship between horizontal and vertical alliances may contribute - in either way - to 
the development of dynamic capabilities that enable firms to strengthen and renew its 
competitive advantage in order to meet (rapidly) changing environmental demands (Teece et 
al., 1997; Eisenhard and Martin, 2000).  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
  Empirical tests on a large panel set of innovating firms in the Netherlands provided first 
of all support for the idea that alliance strategies with different partner types exhibit different 
degrees of persistence. Customer alliance strategies exhibit a higher degree of persistence 
than supplier or competitor alliance  strategies, which could be attributed to the strategic 
importance of customers as collaboration partner throughout the innovation process whereas 
this comes with relatively limited governance risks. These risks constitute a greater concern in 
collaboration with suppliers and competitors, mitigating a firm’s propensity to be engaged in 
suppliers and competitor alliance strategies.  25 
 
  Second, our findings showed that alliance strategies with different partner types are 
interrelated  and that such interrelation effects are not necessarily less pronounced than 
persistence effects. We observed two patterns of interrelationships. First, there is an important 
interrelation between the two types of vertical alliance strategies (collaboration with suppliers 
and customers). Past supplier collaboration predicts current customer alliance strategies and 
vice versa, while the strongest and most significant persistence was found for a joint supplier 
and customer alliance strategy. These results are consistent with the notion that a combined 
supplier-customer alliance strategy may contribute to the development of dynamic 
capabilities encompassing the entire value chain (Teece et al., 1997; Stalk et al., 1992) as well 
as with earlier findings that firms persistently pursuing an integrative collaborative strategy 
with suppliers and customers tend to exhibit superior performance (Narasimhan and Jayaram, 
1998; Vickery et al., 2003; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Rosenzweig et al., 2003). Second, 
the analysis revealed a  specific pattern of  interrelation between horizontal and vertical 
alliance strategies. Prior engagement in horizontal alliances consistently affected the 
propensity of engagement in supplier and/or customer alliance strategies with a longer (4 
years) lag, while no impact was found for effects with a shorter lag (2 years). These findings 
are in line with our conjecture that a longer lag allows for a sequence of discovery and 
experimentation in horizontal collaboration followed by upscaling and commercialization in 
vertical collaboration in such a way that governance risks can be mitigated while combinatory 
resource benefits can still be reaped. The pattern resembles a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
strategy to combine exploration and exploitation through a temporal separation between the 
two activities (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006).   
  In conclusion, our findings suggest that alliance strategies with different partner types 
are  interrelated. This is an interesting new insight  that stands in contrast with the 
compartmentalized approach taken in most of the literature until now. Prior studies have often 26 
 
tended to focus on one type of alliances at a time or have implicitly considered horizontal 
alliances and vertical alliances as  unrelated. Instead, our study shows that differences in 
partner attributes along partner types do matter and cannot be ignored, as evident 
interdependencies operate across them.  
  We see several suggestions and possible avenues for future research as they arise from 
our findings. First, while interdependencies between different alliances have been studied in 
the portfolio approach to alliances (Hoffman, 2007; Vassolo et al, 2004; Wassner, 2009; 
Lokshin and Duysters, 2008), relationships between alliances with different partner types 
have not received due attention in prior studies. What seems to emerge from our analysis is 
that while the portfolio approach examines simultaneous strategies, some particular alliance 
configurations may be more effective if combined in a more sequential manner, to reduce 
governance risks and to avoid conflict. This is partially related to the notion of sub-additivity 
or conflict in alliance portfolios (Vassolo et al, 2004; Wassmer, 2009) where combining 
certain types of alliances may lead to suboptimal results. Yet our findings indicate that in 
some cases, alternating alliance strategies and an inter-temporal portfolio approach may solve 
such critical issues related to simultaneous alliance strategies. The understanding of the role 
of such interdependencies is important as they serve as critical determinants for the extent in 
which a firm derives value from its portfolio (Wassmer, 2009). Clearly, combining an inter-
temporal and simultaneous dimension of alliance portfolios suggests a promising avenue for 
future research. 
  Our study also reflects on the network perspective on alliances. Whereas the findings 
are in line with the general wisdom that firms sharing strategic interdependence are more 
likely to engage in alliances when compared to non-interdependent firms (Stuart, 1998; Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999), our study could be seen to extend this commonly held idea in a number 
of ways. We show that persistence in alliance strategies with a specific partner type is not 27 
 
only shaped by bilateral dependence but also by interdependence with other partner types. 
Whereas until now collaboration has been considered as operating between firms from only 
two interdependent ‘strategic groups’ (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999), our 
findings suggest that an alliance strategy with a specific partner type is also affected by other 
strategic groups from which different partner types originate. Furthermore, our study sheds 
some more light on how interrelationships between alliances types and time elapsed are 
related. The findings on the relationship between horizontal and vertical alliance strategies, 
suggested that a degree of delay can increase the propensity to be engaged in vertical 
collaboration rather than reduce it. This finding is consonant to the curvilinear effect of time 
elapsed on alliance formation found in pioneering work by Gulati (1995b). Whilst this effect 
was unexpected from a network embeddedness perspective in his study, the combination of a 
competence and governance perspective as taken in our study suggests that some delay 
enables to mitigate risks whereas too much delay sacrifices combinatory benefits.
8  
  Our explorative research had a number of limitations, which could be addressed in 
future work. An important limitation was that the panel data set used does not identify 
alliance partners by name, such that we could not distinguish whether persistence is with the 
same or different firms within alliances types. The explanations that we proposed for partner 
type persistence  and interrelation in collaboration were therefore broader and related  to 
innovation processes and strategic collaboration needs  as well as to  governance  issues 
pertaining to collaboration with a category of partners, within which firms may substitute a 
specific partner firm. A different research approach utilizing longitudinal datasets identifying 
partner names as well as partner types would allow texamining differences in persistence 
across the same type and for the same partner. Another issue for future research is to develop 
an integrated theoretical perspective that allows to distinguish between, and to assess the 
                                                 
8 Interestingly enough, the optimum delay that he finds is approx. 3.8 years. This is very close to the four year 
lag that we found to be robust in our analysis.   28 
 
contingent importance of, the various theoretical streams from which hypotheses on 
persistence and interrelation between alliance types may be derived. Empirical test could then 
focus on the firm level antecedents of (differences in) persistence, and provide insights 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix among variables used in model (N=4632) 
 
  Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  16  15 
1 CUSt;  0.10  0.30  1.00                           
2 SUPt  0.13  0.34  0.68  1.00                         
3 COMt  0.07  0.25  0.56  0.53  1.00                       
4 CUSt-2  0.10  0.30  0.20  0.19  0.12  1.00                     
5 CUSt-4  0.09  0.29  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.16  1.00                   
6 SUPt-2  0.12  0.33  0.22  0.23  0.15  0.59  0.14  1.00                 
7 SUPt-4  0.11  0.31  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.15  0.51  0.17  1.00               
8 COMt-2  0.07  0.25  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.51  0.09  0.48  0.10  1.00             
9 COMt-4  0.07  0.25  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.40  0.07  0.38  0.14  1.00           
10 R&Dt-2  0.03  0.17  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.13  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.13  0.12  1.00         
11 R&Dsqt-2  0.03  1.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.87  1.00       
12 SIZEt-2  4.81  1.04  0.18  0.21  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.06  0.03  1.00     
13 MNEt  0.34  0.47  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.11  0.04  0.12  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.09  1.00   
14 DOM GROUPt  0.51  0.49  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.03  -0.73  1.00 
15 AGEt  26.27  10.78  -0.07  -0.05  -0.06  -0.03  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  0.03 




Table 2 Multivariate probit analysis of the propensity to form technology alliances 
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Rho/2  0.88*** 
(0.02) 
   





Time dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included
  Included
 
Location (province) dummies  Included  Included
  Included
 
Number of firms  3181  3181  3181 
Number of observations  4632  4632  4632 
Wald  ) 39 (
2 χ , p-value< 0.001  671.49     
Log-likelihood   -2581.53     
   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
† p<0.1 (Significant at 10% level) 
* p<0.05 (Significant at 5% level) 
** p< 0.01 (Significant at 1% level) 







Appendix: Probit analysis of the propensity to form customer & supplier technology 
alliances 






  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















































































Rho/2  0.88*** 
(0.02) 
   





Time dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included
  Included
 
Location (province) dummies  Included  Included
  Included
 
Number of firms  3181  3181  3181 
Number of observations  4632  4632  4632 
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2 χ , p-value< 0.001  671.49     
Log-likelihood   -2581.53     
   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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